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The Role of International Non-governmental Organisations in the Universal Periodic 




This article explores the benefits and challenges of involvement by international NGOs in the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of twelve Pacific Island states before the UN Human 
Rights Council. An interesting feature of NGO involvement in the UPR for Pacific states is 
that, in most cases, the number of submissions from international NGOs exceeds the number 
of submissions from national Pacific NGOs. International NGOs therefore have a significant 
input into the UPR for Pacific states.  
This article queries whether the dominance of international NGOs has a distorting effect, 
such that Pacific perspectives on current human rights challenges are not being heard in 
Geneva. The article considers what steps might be taken so that international NGOs ‘do good 
better’ in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of the UPR – improving the human rights 
situation on the ground in the Pacific. 





*1 BA, LLB (Hons), LLM, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Canterbury. I am grateful to the 
participants at the ‘Law and Culture’ Conference at the University of the South Pacific, Port Vila, Vanuatu, 9-11 
September 2013 for their feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I also appreciate the comments of the two 




Pacific Island states have traditionally had minimal engagement with United Nations 
human rights mechanisms. They have a comparatively low rate of ratification of the core 
human rights treaties and where treaties have been ratified, states are often overdue with their 
periodic reports. Most Pacific states do not maintain permanent diplomatic representation in 
Geneva. In this context, the active and open engagement of Pacific states in the UN Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (‘UPR’) is a welcome development. In addition, 
a number of national non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) based in the Pacific have 
taken the opportunity to make stakeholder submissions for the review of their states. For 
many, this marks their first ever involvement with a UN human rights mechanism. Again, 
this is a very welcome development. 
This article considers the input of international NGOs into the 17 reviews to date of 
twelve Pacific Island states. The states reviewed are the island members of the Pacific Islands 
Forum who are also UN members.2 These are (in order of their review) Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (‘FSM’), Nauru, 
Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa and Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’). All states have been 
reviewed once during the first UPR cycle, and the first five have had their second review, 
with Kiribati reviewed most recently in January 2015. To date, the number of stakeholder 
submissions has ranged from three for Tonga and Tuvalu II to 17 for Fiji. An interesting 
feature of the stakeholder submissions is that, for most states, the number of submissions 
from international NGOs exceeded the number of national NGO submissions. International 
NGOs therefore have a significant input into OHCHR’s stakeholder summary for Pacific 
states and thus into the UPR itself. 
This article queries whether the involvement of international NGOs has a distorting 
effect, such that perspectives of Pacific civil society on current human rights challenges are 
not being heard in Geneva. The article explores the undoubted benefits of NGO involvement 
in the UPR of Pacific states, and considers what steps might be taken to facilitate a deeper 
and more productive relationship between national Pacific NGOs and international NGOs in 
order to better contribute to the ultimate goal of the UPR – ‘improvement of the human rights 
situation on the ground’3 in the Pacific. 
Part II of this article provides an overview of human rights and the UPR in the 
Pacific. Part III examines the role envisaged for NGOs in the UPR. Part IV outlines the actual 
input of NGOs into the UPR of Pacific states. Part V analyses the benefits of participation by 
these international NGOs and considers some of the challenges. Part VI considers how 
international NGOs might improve their work in the Pacific; how they might ‘do good 
better.’ The article concludes that while the involvement of international NGOs in the UPR of 
Pacific states is useful in a number of respects, it also brings with it the risk of diluting the 
Pacific civil society voice in Geneva, and perhaps even contributing to a distorted human 
rights ‘picture’ of a particular state. Some suggestions are made as to practical steps which 
could be taken by international NGOs to engage with Pacific NGOs in their UPR advocacy.  
 
2 Australia and New Zealand are also members of PIF. However, they are excluded from the scope of this paper 
because they are deeply engaged with UN human rights mechanisms, and their UPR experience was quite 
different. The Cook Islands and Niue are also members of PIF in their own right, but because they are not UN 
members they were not reviewed via the UPR. 
3 A/HRC/RES/5/1 (2007), Annex, [4(a)]. 
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II. The Universal Periodic Review and the Pacific: An Overview  
 
The UPR, first initiated in 2008, involves a review by the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) 
of the human rights records of all 193 UN member states once every four and a half years. 
The first full cycle of the UPR was completed in 2012, and the second cycle is currently 
underway. While assessments of the success of the UPR mechanism have varied, on the 
whole it has been regarded as a generally positive development.4 This has certainly been the 
experience in the Pacific, with the UPR generating an enthusiasm and momentum for 
engagement with international human rights machinery which has been largely absent in 
relation to the treaty mechanisms.5 In this section, the current human rights challenges in the 
Pacific are outlined as well as the strengths and limitations of the UPR process in the Pacific 
context in order to set the scene for a closer examination of the role of international NGOs in 
Pacific states’ UPR.6  
 
A. Human rights challenges in the Pacific 
 
The Pacific is not a region known for gross violations of human rights. The most glaring 
human rights issue in recent years was the 2006 coup d’état in Fiji, which resulted in not only 
the loss of democracy but also attendant human rights violations. There have also been 
periods of civil unrest in other states including Solomon Islands (1998-2003, 2007), Tonga 
(2006), Vanuatu (2007) and PNG (2009 and 2011). An ‘imported’ and deeply concerning 
current human rights issue is the detention of Australia’s asylum seekers in Nauru and on 
Manus Island in PNG.  
A major current human rights concern is the adverse impact of climate change. Other 
common issues are the right to equality and non-discrimination for women. A particular issue 
is the high levels of violence against women and children and the very low levels of women 
in leadership positions. A feature of many states is the tension that sometimes arises between 
 
4 See for example Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and Challenges: Entering into the Second cycle of the Universal 
Periodic Review’ (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 187; Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 
‘Universal Periodic Review: Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?’ 
(2012) New Zealand Law Review 673; Rosa Freedman, ‘New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 289; Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, ‘A Step Ahead 
in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2012) 18 
Global Governance 231; Connie de la Vega and Tamara Lewis, ‘Peer Review in the Mix: how the UPR 
Transforms Human Rights Discourse’, in M Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the 
UN Human Rights Machinery (2011); Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds) Human Rights and the 
Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP, 2015). For a contrasting view, see Christian 
Tomuschat, ‘Universal Periodic Review: A New System of International Law with Specific Ground Rules?’ in 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest (OUP, 2011) 609. 
5 For other commentary on Pacific experience with the UPR, see Natalie Baird, ‘The Universal Periodic Review 
as a Legacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Potential Pacific Impact’, in Roderic Alley (ed), 
Celebrating Human Rights: Sixty Years of the Universal Declaration: Proceedings of the Wellington 
Conference (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs and New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 
2009); Rhona Smith, ‘The Pacific Island States: Themes emerging from the United Nations Human Rights 
Council’s Inaugural Universal Periodic Review?’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 569. 
6 This summary is drawn in part from Natalie Baird, ‘The Universal Periodic Review: Building a Bridge 
between the Pacific and Geneva?’, in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the 
Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP, 2015) 187-212.  
4 
 
traditional custom and human rights.7 Traditional patriarchal structures sometimes have a 
negative impact on the rights of women, youths and children. For example, in some states 
women are unable to inherit title to land. In others, there are conflicts between the freedoms 
of movement and religion on the one hand and the authority of traditional leaders and the 
custom of banishment on the other. Sometimes freedom of expression conflicts with notions 
of respect for traditional leaders. Another issue receiving increasing attention in the region is 
the treatment of people with disabilities.  
Most states also face very real practical challenges in terms of lack of resources to protect 
and promote human rights. Indeed, many human rights issues in the Pacific can be traced to a 
lack of financial and human resources rather than deliberate violation. There are numerous 
other competing priorities for scarce state resources. Most states do not have a fully-fledged 
national human rights institution; some do not even have a national focal point for human 
rights. Treaty ratification is comparatively low, with many states yet to ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Indeed, the challenges associated with simply 
engaging with treaty mechanisms and complying with onerous reporting obligations, let alone 
the more important task of implementing those obligations, may outweigh the benefits.8 
 
B. Strengths of the UPR process 
 
A significant strength of the UPR process in the Pacific has been that states and NGOs 
have – for the most part – engaged enthusiastically with the new mechanism. With the 
exception of Fiji, whose experience as a post-coup state was quite different, Pacific states 
have engaged in the process in good faith. There is a high degree of honesty, openness and 
self-reflection evident in the national reports and the interactive dialogue. With the 
encouragement of the triumvirate of the OHCHR’s Pacific Office (‘OHCHR Pacific’), the 
Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team (‘RRRT’) based at the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (‘PIFS’), Pacific states have 
approached the UPR as an opportunity to ‘tell the Pacific’s human rights stories to the 
world.’9 A particular success in this regard was the focus given to the impact of climate 
change on human rights in the Pacific. 
In terms of NGO engagement in Pacific states’ UPR, three points are worth noting at this 
stage. First, despite the geographical challenges, the Pacific experience confirms the 
accessibility of the UPR process to national grass roots organisations. Second, for most of the 
17 Pacific reviews, again with the exception of Fiji and Fiji II, consultation between the 
government and civil society was robust and productive. Before each state’s review, 
workshops involving both government officials and civil society representatives were 
facilitated by OHCHR Pacific, RRRT and PIFS. These were especially instrumental in 
supporting consultation on the national report and paving the way for national NGO reports. 
Thirdly, and as noted above, both national and international NGOs made stakeholder 
submissions on Pacific states’ reviews. In terms of bare numbers, these ranged from three 
 
7 See New Zealand Law Commission, Converging Currents: Custom and Human Rights in the Pacific (Study 
Paper No 17, 2006). 
8 See Natalie Baird, ‘To Ratify or not to Ratify? An Assessment of the Case for Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties in the Pacific’ (2011) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 249. 
9 This is a reference to the title of RRRT’s publication Telling Pacific Human Rights Stories to the World: A 




stakeholder submissions for Tonga I and Tuvalu II to 17 stakeholder submissions on Fiji. For 
most states, there were more submissions from international NGOs than national NGOs. 
A number of features of the UPR process appear well-suited to Pacific NGOs and states. 
In particular, the UPR is not to be ‘overly burdensome’10 and should not be ‘overly long.’11 It 
should also ‘take into account the level of development and specificities of countries.’12 The 
requirement that the interactive dialogue be ‘conducted in an objective, transparent, non-
selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicised manner’13 rather than 
‘naming and shaming’ also appears beneficial to Pacific states.14 It enables limitations and 
shortcomings to be openly acknowledged, without fear of harsh judgment. As noted by 
RRRT, the UPR ‘is a supportive process, conducted much like the Pacific way, in the form of 
a dialogue or an exchange of views.’15 More controversially, but no less important, the 
emphasis on interactive dialogue enables interesting exchanges on the meaning of rights in 
the local context. A number of Pacific states thus acknowledged tensions between traditional 
customs and human rights, while also emphasising the commonality between the underlying 
values of custom and human rights. 
The outcome of the UPR, namely a clear list of recommendations to which the state under 
review (‘SuR’) has agreed, is also of particular use in the Pacific. Most Pacific states do not 
have a national human rights institution, and so the list of recommendations agreed to by the 
SuR therefore emerges from the UPR as a de facto national human rights action plan. It can 
be used by the state itself to plan initiatives for the next four and a half years, by the 
international community to identify areas for technical assistance and by civil society to 
engage in advocacy. 
One of the objectives of the UPR is ‘the improvement of the human rights situation on the 
ground.’16 There are some promising signs of implementation. A positive early sign is the 
nine standing invitations to the UN special procedures issued by the Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.17 In 2012, three special 
procedures also undertook country visits in the Pacific, with the Special Rapporteur on Toxic 
Waste visiting the Marshall Islands, the Special Rapporteur on Water and Sanitation visiting 
Kiribati and Tuvalu and the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women visiting PNG 
and Solomon Islands. In 2014, the Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions visited PNG.  
Another positive sign is the number of treaty ratifications since states have had their first 
review, with all states except Tonga taking some sort of positive treaty action. Fiji has signed 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and its Optional 
Protocol. Kiribati has ratified the CRPD and the Convention against Corruption. The 
Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands have ratified the Convention against Corruption. FSM 
has also ratified the Convention against Corruption, and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography, and signed the CRPD. Nauru has ratified the Convention against Torture and 
 
10 Annex, above n 3, [3(h)]. 
11 Ibid, [3(i)]. 
12 Ibid, [3(l)]. 
13 Ibid, [3(g)]. 
14 For the benefits of the UPR approach, see generally Elvira Dominguez Redondo, ‘Universal Periodic Review: 
Is There Life Beyond “Naming and Shaming” in Human Rights Implementation?’ (2012) New Zealand Law 
Review 673. 
15 RRRT, above n 9, 10. 
16 Annex, above n 3, [4(a)]. 
17 See ‘Standing Invitations as at 1 January 2015’ at <www.ohchr.org>. 
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’) and its Optional 
Protocol, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(‘CEDAW’), the CRPD, the Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Convention 
against Corruption. In 2011, Palau, which had then only ratified the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, signed the outstanding eight core human rights treaties, and followed this 
up with ratification of CRPD and its Optional Protocol in 2013. PNG and Tuvalu have 
ratified the CRPD. Samoa has signed the CRPD, and in 2012, became the first Pacific state to 
ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. Vanuatu has ratified CAT, the Convention against Corruption and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
In terms of engagement with treaty bodies, a number of overdue reports have been 
submitted. Fiji has submitted its 18th-20th combined report to the CERD Committee and its 
2nd-4th combined report to the CRC Committee. Samoa has submitted its 2nd-4th combined 
report to the CRC Committee. Solomon Islands has submitted its 1st-3rd combined report to 
the CEDAW Committee. Tuvalu has completed its Common Core Document, submitted its 
first report to the CRC Committee and its 3rd-4th combined report to the CEDAW Committee. 
Vanuatu has submitted its 4th-5th combined report to the CEDAW Committee. 
Beyond this openness to further engagement with UN human rights machinery, initiatives 
which will undoubtedly make a difference to human rights on the ground include Tonga’s 
constitutional and political reforms of 2010 which have resulted in a more democratic form of 
government, the 2014 return to democracy in Fiji, the establishment of national human rights 
bodies in Samoa and Vanuatu, and the enactment of the family violence legislation in Fiji, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and PNG. While strict causation between 
these developments and the UPR cannot be established, the UPR is likely to have been at 
least an additional prompt for reform. 
 
C. Limitations of the UPR process 
 
While the Pacific experience with the UPR process to date has been primarily positive, 
the UPR does have some limitations as a mechanism for positive human rights change. First 
and foremost, while the UPR has been beneficial in deepening Pacific engagement with the 
international human rights machinery, the reality is that Geneva is still a long way away. 
Until recently, no Pacific state had permanent diplomatic representation in Geneva. This 
limits the ability of Pacific states to participate in the reviews of other states and to benefit 
from informal opportunities in and around Geneva. Similar concerns arise for Pacific NGOs. 
To date, only two Pacific side-events have been held in Geneva, with only a handful of civil 
society representatives travelling from the Pacific for the UPR. Since April 2012, the 
international NGO UPR Info has held pre-session meetings in Geneva for NGOs and NHRIs 
to present to interested states before the formal UPR interactive dialogue. Encouragingly, pre-
session meetings have been held for Tuvalu II, Fiji II and Kiribati II, but in each case only 
international NGOs were able to attend.18  
A second limitation of the process is that one is sometimes left with a sense that the 
Pacific reality is not well understood in Geneva. For example, during Tuvalu’s interactive 
dialogue, a Northern European country asked Tuvalu to explain why it condoned large scale 
torture in Tuvalu. This caused much amusement to the Tuvaluan delegation given the absence 
of torture in Tuvalu (and the significant freedom of movement accorded to Tuvaluan 
 
18 Personal communication with UPR Info (XX January 2015, on file with author). 
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prisoners) but it does highlight the apparent lack of knowledge of the Pacific in Geneva.19 A 
deeper concern is the oft-repeated recommendations from other states that Pacific states 
‘ratify all outstanding human rights treaties’ in the face of clear statements by the Pacific SuR 
that it has limited resources and capacity to do this.20 These types of exchange suggest a 
shallow and rhetorical engagement by other states with the human rights concerns of Pacific 
states and a failure to appreciate the very real challenges which they face. Such rhetorical and 
ritualistic behaviour arises not only in the Pacific, or indeed only under the auspices of the 
UPR mechanism, but has been identified as a feature of international human rights 
mechanisms generally.21 
A final limitation of the UPR is the risk that the full human rights story of a Pacific state 
may not be heard in Geneva. There are a number of reasons for this. The agenda for the UPR 
is very much set by the self-reporting of the SuR in its national report. Unlike many other 
states however, Pacific states participate in the UPR as relative unknowns. They have a low 
international profile and limited diplomatic engagement with other states. States involved in 
the interactive dialogue of Pacific states are thus unlikely to have their own ready store of 
information on which to base their interventions. This is one reason why the role of NGOs in 
Pacific states’ UPR is particularly important. The stakeholder summary, prepared by OHCHR 
from the stakeholder submissions is important to counter the national report and arm other 
states with information for the interactive dialogue. However, with the dominance of 
international NGOs making submissions on Pacific states, there is a risk that the stakeholder 
summary may present a distorted view of human rights challenges on the ground. It is the 
operation of this aspect of the UPR in the Pacific that is put under closer examination in this 
article.  
 
III. The Role of NGOs in the UPR 
 
Before looking more closely at the role of NGOs in the UPR process, a note on 
terminology may be helpful. For the purposes of this article, a ‘non-governmental 
organisation’ is defined as a ‘not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ group, which is organized on 
a local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public good.’22 This 
article seeks to draw a distinction between ‘international NGOs’ and ‘national NGOs.’ 
‘International NGOs’ are regarded as those whose activities involve at least two states, while 
‘national NGOs’ are those whose activities involve only one state.23 However, it is important 
to keep in mind that there is not always a clear-cut distinction between a national NGO and 
an international NGO. For example, national NGOs may turn to international NGOs when 
they are unable to ‘achieve accountability for human rights violations through domestic 
 
19 RRRT, above n 9, 48. 
20 See generally Natalie Baird, ‘To Ratify or Not to Ratify? An Assessment of the Case for Ratification of 
International Human Rights Treaties in the Pacific’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 249. 
21 See further Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: 
Rituals and Ritualism (CUP, 2015). 
22 Adam McBeth, Justine Nolan and Simon Rice, The International Law of Human Rights (OUP, 2011), 318, 
citing the definition used by the UN Department of Public Information.   
23 This demarcation is drawn from article 1(c) of the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal 
Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations (opened for signature 24 April 1986, entered into 
force 1 January 1991) which essentially defines international NGOs as those which ‘carry on their activities 
with effect in at least two States.’  
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means of redress.’24 International NGOs may partner with national NGOs for the purposes of 
fact-finding and on-the-ground research. Increasingly, the distinction between international 
and national NGOs is – appropriately – blurred. This point will be revisited later in this 
article. 
NGOs are formally recognised in article 71 of the UN Charter which provides that ‘[t]he 
Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.’ These 
arrangements, which are a major gateway for NGO involvement in UN processes, are known 
as ‘ECOSOC consultative status.’ Over 4,000 organisations have ECOSOC consultative 
status,25 but the North-South balance is slightly skewed with only 33 percent having their 
headquarters in the Global South.26 Although the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) is a 
subsidiary body of the General Assembly rather than ECOSOC, it continues to use ECOSOC 
consultative status as a requirement for NGO participation in some of its activities.27 There 
are however opportunities for NGO input into HRC processes that do not require ECOSOC 
consultative status. In particular in terms of the focus of this article, the key opportunity for 
NGO involvement in the UPR – the submission of a stakeholder report – is available to all 
NGOs, including those who do not hold ECOSOC consultative status. 
 
A. NGO input into the UPR process 
 
The institution-building package of the HRC describes one of the principles of the UPR 
as being to ‘ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders.’28 Stakeholders are said to 
include NGOs, national human rights institutions (‘NHRIs’), human rights defenders, 
academic institutions and research institutes, regional organisations and civil society 
representatives.29 There are five main opportunities for stakeholder involvement in the UPR 
process. The first opportunity is by participating in state consultations on the national report. 
States are encouraged to prepare the information they submit ‘through a broad consultation 
process at the national level with all relevant stakeholders.’30 
The second and most significant opportunity for NGO involvement in the UPR is the 
ability to make written submissions for the stakeholder summary. The large majority of 
stakeholder submissions come from NGOs, with a report from the national NHRI where one 
exists, and occasional reports from academic institutions. Stakeholders send their submissions 
to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) which is charged with 
 
24 Michael H Posner and Candy Whittome, ‘The Status of Human Rights NGOs’ (1994) 25 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review 269, 274. 
25 As at 1 September 2014, the webpage of the NGO branch of the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs lists 4,164 organisations with consultative status. See <http://esango.un.org>. 
26 ECOSOC ‘Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the Council by Region’ (2007) at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/about.htm>. 
27 General Assembly Human Rights Council A/RES/60/251 (2006), [11] provides that ‘the participation of and 
consultation with observers, including … national human rights institutions, as well as non-governmental 
organizations, shall be based on arrangements, including Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 … 
and practices observed by the Commission on Human Rights, while ensuring the most effective contribution of 
these entities.’ 
28 Annex, above n 3, [3(m)]. 
29 OHCHR ‘Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism’ (July 2008), fn 1. See also Annex, above n 3, [3(m)], giving NGOs and NHRIs as illustrations of 
stakeholders. 
30 Annex, above n 3, [15(a)]. 
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preparing a 10-page report summarising ‘additional credible and reliable information 
provided by other relevant stakeholders.’31 As noted, ECOSOC consultative status is not 
required in order to make a stakeholder submission. The guidelines for stakeholders provide 
that a submission by a single stakeholder must be no longer than 2815 words (or five pages), 
and a joint submission by two or more stakeholders must be no longer than 5630 words (or 
ten pages).32 No matter the total number or length of stakeholder submissions, they are all 
summarised by OHCHR into a single ‘stakeholder summary’ which is a maximum of ten 
pages. Since the beginning of the second cycle, information provided by an accredited NHRI 
is contained in a separate section of the OHCHR summary.33 The original stakeholder reports 
are available as background documents by way of a footnote on the official UPR 
documentation webpage for each state. 
There are no formal opportunities for NGO participation in the crucial interactive 
dialogue between the SuR and the UPR Working Group. That is limited to state participation 
only, although NGOs with consultative status are able to attend the Working Group session 
as observers.34 NGOs with consultative status may also organise ‘Information Meetings’ on 
the UPR process, with a view to sharing information and best practices.35 The NGO in charge 
of organising the meeting is able to invite guests without consultative status to attend. There 
are also informal opportunities for lobbying in the hallways of the Palais des Nations. 
Opportunities also exist in the home state to lobby diplomatic representatives of states likely 
to take a role in the interactive dialogue in Geneva. 
At the final adoption of the outcome report by the HRC plenary, some months after the 
interactive dialogue, there is a fourth, albeit minor, opportunity for NGO input. One hour is 
allocated for consideration of the outcome report, and NGOs with consultative status are 
allocated 20 minutes for making verbal comments.36 Since 2012, the HRC has permitted 
these statements to be made by video.37 However, such statements have little substantive 
impact because the content of the outcome report is essentially settled by this stage. A 
summary of general comments made by stakeholders is included in the report of the relevant 
HRC session.38 Statements by NGOs at this point in the process have received little attention 
in the commentaries on the UPR to date - due no doubt to their limited efficacy.39 
The fifth and final opportunity for NGO involvement is in the follow-up to the review. 
While the outcome of the review should be implemented primarily by the SuR, states are 
encouraged to conduct broad consultations with relevant stakeholders.40 NGOs can clearly 
 
31 Annex, above n 3, [15(c)]. 
32 OHCHR ‘A Practical Guide for Civil Society: Universal Periodic Review’ (undated), 14. 
33 A/HRC/RES/16/21 (2011), Annex, [9]. 
34 Annex, above n 3, [18(c)]; OHCHR ‘Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the Universal 
Periodic Review Mechanism’ (July 2008) at [18]; OHCHR ‘A Practical Guide for Civil Society: Universal 
Periodic Review’ (undated), 4. 
35 OHCHR ‘Universal Periodic Review: NGO Information Meeting Room Request Form.’  
36 Annex, above n 3, [31]; OHCHR ‘Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the Universal 
Periodic Review Mechanism’ (July 2008) at [19]; OHCHR ‘A Practical Guide for Civil Society: Universal 
Periodic Review’ (undated), 4. 
37 A/HRC/DEC/19/119 (2012), Annex, [47(a)]. 
38 PRST/9/2 (24 September 2008) sets out the word limit for this documentation and provides that the report of 
the HRC plenary session at which the Outcome Report is adopted will be up to 3,210 words/country with the 
‘number of words prorated to speaking time used by each category of speaker within agreed time limits.’ 
39 The list of NGOs making statements at the plenary session is not available on the official OHCHR 
documentation pages for the UPR, but a list of submitters and the text of the statement (where supplied by the 
NGO) is available at <www.upr-info.org>. 
40 Annex, above n 3, [33]; A/HRC/RES/16/21 (2011), Annex, [17]. 
10 
 
play an important role in the follow-up to the review. National NGOs are particularly well-
placed to use the UPR outcome as a lobbying tool at home to ensure that recommendations 
accepted by the state are implemented. 
 
B. Do NGO submissions matter?41 
 
This article focuses on stakeholder submissions as the key opportunity for NGOs to 
influence the content of the UPR. Before looking at the detail of the Pacific UPR experience, 
it is relevant to consider the extent to which NGO submissions actually make a difference to 
the UPR process. Measuring or assessing the impact of NGOs in any context is difficult,42 
and is more challenging in the case of advocacy NGOs than service NGOs. In the context of 
the UPR, only limited research on this point has been undertaken to date. However, the 
research which has been done suggests that although the UPR is, at its heart, a state-run and 
state-led process, ‘the civil society/CSO perspective has the potential to enrich the process 
and strengthen impacts.’43 
A study by Lawrence Moss of the second session of the UPR in May 2008 suggested that 
NGOs had substantial success in injecting their human rights concerns into the UPR process, 
but that states showed considerable resistance to accepting NGO recommendations.44 A 2010 
study by the Child Rights Information Network (‘CRIN’) found that in its national report, the 
SuR tended to give prominence to ‘safer’ issues such as children’s education, whereas NGOs 
and UN bodies (the latter reflected in OHCHR’s compilation of UN information prepared for 
each SuR) had more balance between softer issues such as education and more controversial 
issues such as corporal punishment. While states made a number of recommendations on 
children’s education, the number of recommendations on corporal punishment was much 
higher than the number of references by the SuR on corporal punishment, suggesting that 
NGO submissions (and the UN Compilation) made a difference and prompted other states to 
make recommendations on this issue.45 
More recent research by political scientist Professor McMahon examines the extent to 
which state recommendations in the UPR reflected draft recommendations proposed by civil 
society organisations. McMahon’s research suggests that two-thirds of NGO 
recommendations are reflected in state recommendations.46 While this finding does not 
suggest a causal link between NGO and state recommendations, it does show that state 
recommendations encompass NGO recommendations to a significant extent. McMahon 
concludes that this suggests that NGO engagement is worthwhile and that the high correlation 
between NGO and state recommendations supports the overall legitimacy of the UPR 
process.47 
 
41 This title draws on E McMahon et al, The Universal Periodic Review: Do Civil Society Organization-
Suggested Recommendations Matter? (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Geneva, November 2013).  
42 See Shamima Ahmed, ‘The Impact of NGOs on International Organisations: Complexities and 
Considerations’ (2010-2011) 36 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 817. 
43 McMahon, above n 41, 12-13. 
44 Lawrence Moss, ‘Opportunities for Nongovernmental Organization Advocacy in the Universal Peer Review 
Process at the UN Human Rights Council’ (2010) 2(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 122, 123. 
45 Child Rights Information Network, Universal Periodic Review: The Status of Children’s Rights: An Analysis 
of trends/Review of NGO Participation (CRIN, London, 2010), 16-17. 
46 McMahon, above n 41, 7. 




IV. Involvement of NGOs in the UPR of Pacific States 
 
I now turn to consider the involvement of NGOs in the UPR of Pacific states. The focus 
here is on stakeholder submissions. This is the key opportunity to influence the interactive 
dialogue, the content of the outcome report and the substance of the recommendations. I will 
also consider more briefly the NGO statements made during the adoption of the outcome 
report at the relevant HRC plenary session. 
 
A. Stakeholder Submissions 
 
Table One summarises the stakeholder submissions made during the UPR for Pacific 
states. Some explanation and caution are needed when considering the Table. First, the 
categorisation of an NGO as ‘national’ or ‘international’ involved some difficult choices. In 
accordance with the definition set out earlier, the approach taken is to categorise an NGO as 
‘national’ if, although being an international organisation, it has a separate local section or 
branch which undertakes its activities solely in the state concerned. For example, Save the 
Children Fiji and Transparency International Vanuatu were categorised as ‘national’ NGOs, 
although they are each linked to an international NGO. On the other hand, the Pacific 
Concerns Resource Centre, which made a submission on Fiji and has its only office in Fiji, 
was categorised as an international NGO as it undertakes its activities across the Pacific 
region. A second caveat is in relation to joint submissions. Joint submissions are made by two 
or more stakeholders and are actively encouraged by OHCHR.48 As can be seen, a number of 
both national and international submissions were joint submissions. Care therefore needs to 
be taken with referring to the bald number of reports alone as it may hide a joint submission 
by a number of NGOs. Where there is a joint submission, the number of organisations joining 
that submission is indicated in parentheses. Finally, for the sake of clarity, it is also noted that 
the phenomenon evident in other parts of the world whereby NGOs join multiple coalitions 
and add their name to more than one joint submission has not yet been widely adopted in the 
Pacific. Only five national NGOs have to date formally signed on to more than one 
submission.49 
 
Table One: Stakeholder Submissions for Pacific States 
State  
(year of review) 



















Tonga  3 1 single 1 single  - 
 
48 OHCHR ‘Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders on the Universal Periodic Review 
Mechanism’ (July 2008), [13]; OHCHR ‘A Practical Guide for Civil Society: Universal Periodic Review’ 
(undated), 15, [16]. 
49 The Nauru Island Association of NGOs was part of a joint national coalition and a joint national/international 
coalition. Nuanua o le Alofa (Samoa) made its own submission and was one of the supporting organisations for 
the joint submission by the Samoan Umbrella for NGOs. The Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre and the Fiji Women’s 
Rights Movement both made individual submissions for Fiji II, and were part of a joint submission by 12 Fijian 
NGOs. Te Toa Matoa (Kiribati) made its own submission for Kiribati II and was one of the supporting 
















1 joint (7 orgs) 
3 single 







1 joint (2 orgs) 






1 joint (2 orgs) 
4 single 
1 joint (3 orgs) 







1 joint (4 orgs) 





- 2 single 1 joint (2 orgs) 






1 joint (4 orgs) 
1 joint (2 orgs) 
1 single 
1 joint (3 orgs) 





1 single 2 single 
1 joint (3 orgs) 







1 joint (9 orgs) 
4 single 
1 single (4 orgs) 
1 single (2 orgs) 







1 joint (100 orgs)50 
2 single 
1 joint (4 orgs) 






1 single 6 single 
1 joint (3 orgs) 
1 joint (3 orgs) 






















1 joint (12 orgs) 
5 single 
1 joint (315 orgs) 







1 joint (35 orgs) 
4 single51 




46 70 4 
 
Keeping those caveats in mind, we can now look at what Table One reveals about NGO 
involvement in the review of Pacific states. In terms of the total number of stakeholder 
submissions on any one state, they range from three submissions for Tonga and Tuvalu II to 
 
50 The submission of the Samoan Umbrella for NGOs (‘SUNGO’) was characterised by OHCHR as a single 
submission even though it is a ten-page submission, and footnote one of the original submission lists over 100 
organisations as comprising its membership. 
51 One of the international NGOs was the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, characterised by OHCHR as 
a ‘regional intergovernmental organisation’ (A/HRC/WG.6/21/KIR/3, 9). However, it is in fact an international 
NGO with ECOSOC consultative status. 
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17 submissions for Fiji. These numbers are fairly modest compared to other parts of the 
world with Venezuela having 579 (!), the United States having 103 and India at 51. Within 
the Pacific region, Australia had 14 for its first review while New Zealand had 17 for its first 
review and 54 for its second.  
The number of submissions by international NGOs mostly exceeds the number of 
national submissions. This is especially glaring for PNG which had just one submission from 
a national NGO and nine submissions from international NGOs. So far, in only five reviews 
(Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu II and Vanuatu II) has the number of national 
submissions exceeded the number of submissions from international NGOs.  
As noted, joint submissions by two or more stakeholders are permitted, encouraged and 
increasingly common. Looking behind the joint submissions, some substantial coalitions can 
be detected. For example, at the national level, there were just two national NGO submissions 
for Vanuatu, but one of these was a submission by a coalition of seven NGOs. Similarly, 
there were two national submissions from Solomon Islands, but one of these was from a 
coalition of nine national NGOs. For both the Tonga and Tonga II reviews, there was just one 
national submission, but for Tonga II, this was a joint submission of seven organisations 
suggesting greater engagement from national NGOs for the second review. Similarly for Fiji, 
there were nine national submissions representing a total of 10 national NGOs; for Fiji II 
there were only three national submissions but they represented a total of 12 national NGOs. 
Of particular interest are the joint submissions from coalitions involving both national and 
international NGOs. To date, there have been just four such submissions, all from the 
Micronesian sub-region – two for FSM, and one each for the Marshall Islands and Nauru. 
Three of these four submissions were coalitions coordinated by Earthjustice. In Nauru, the 
Earthjustice Coalition involved six international NGOs and the national Nauru Island 
Association of NGOs. The Earthjustice Coalitions for the Marshall Islands and FSM involved 
the same five organisations – four international NGOs and the Pohnpei Women’s Advisory 
Council, which is based in FSM.52 The fourth joint submission was for FSM and involved the 
international Sexual Rights Initiative and the national Sexual Rights Information of 
Micronesia.  
 
B. Who are these international NGOs? 
 
Table Two sets out the international NGOs which have made submissions on the 17 Pacific 
reviews. Again, some explanation of the data is required. First, Table Two includes all 
submissions by international NGOs, ie the 70 submissions by international NGOs and the 
four submissions by coalitions of international and national NGOs. Second, there were three 
coalitions of NGOs which have regularly made submissions. Although the make-up of each 
coalition was not always consistent, there is sufficient commonality to treat each of these as 
one group. These are the Earthjustice Coalition, the ILGA/ARC International Coalition and 
the Marist and Franciscans Coalition. In these cases, the headquarters of the coordinating 
NGO(s) have been noted in the Table, with those of coalition partners in footnotes. Third, 
 
52 Because the Pohnpei Women’s Advisory Council (PWAC) made a submission on more than one country, it 
could be categorised as an ‘international’ NGO. However, PWAC is based in FSM and its activities otherwise 
focus solely on Micronesia. Although it agreed to participate in the Earthjustice Coalition for the Marshall 
Islands, this is its only known activity outside FSM. Personal communication with Earthjustice (18 October 
2013, on file with author). 
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while the headquarters of each NGO have been noted, with a view to indicating whether they 
hail from the Global North or South, determining the ‘headquarters’ was sometimes a 
difficult task. Generally, the country of headquarters indicates where the NGO is incorporated 
or where the primary office is located. However, some NGOs actively seek to be truly global 
organisations. For example, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association (ILGA), while headquartered in Brussels, is a global association of more than 
600 lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex groups in over 110 countries. The US-
incorporated 350.org, one of the partners in the Earthjustice Coalition, is a global grassroots 
organisation with staff, supporters and activists in 188 countries around the world. The 
Sexual Rights Initiative explicitly ‘seeks to provide a more global perspective based on the 
experiences of SRI partner organizations’ in light of the fact that NGO participation at the 
Human Rights Council remains largely dominated by organisations based in the Global 
North.53 
Table Two: Submissions by International NGOs on Pacific States 
 








States submitted on 
(in order of their review) 
Global Initiative to End All 
Corporal Punishment of 
Children 
UK 16 Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, 
Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa, 
PNG, Tonga II, Tuvalu II, Vanuatu 
II, Fiji II, Kiribati II 
Earthjustice55 or Earthjustice  
Coalition56 
 
US 11 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, 
Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa, 
PNG 
ARC International57 or ILGA/ 
ARC International Coalition58 
Canada/Belgium 8 Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, 
Solomon Islands, Samoa, PNG 
Amnesty International UK 7 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Solomon Islands, PNG, Fiji II 
Oceania Human Rights US 5 Nauru, Palau, Samoa, PNG, Tonga 
II 
Marist (FMSI) and Franciscans 
(FI) Coalition59 
Italy/Switzerland 5 Vanuatu, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, 
PNG, Kiribati II 
 
53 See <http://sexualrightsinitiative.com/about-us/who-we-are/>. 
54 For Coalitions, the Headquarters of the coordinating NGO(s) alone is noted in the Table. 
55 Earthjustice made a single submission without coalition partners on Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji and Kiribati.   
56 Coalition partners (and their headquarters) were Greenpeace International (Netherlands), Many Strong Voices 
(Norway), Human Rights Advocates (US), IndyAct (Lebanon), 350.org (US), Nauru Island Association of 
NGOs (Nauru) and the Pohnpei Women’s Advisory Council (FSM). 
57 ARC International made a single submission without coalition partners on Fiji.  
58 Coalition partners (and their headquarters) were ILGA-Europe (Belgium) and the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission (US).  
59 Coalition partners (and their headquarters) were Marist Asia – Pacific Solidarity Office (Australia), Edmund 
Rice International (Switzerland), the Marist Oceania Solidarity Commission (Australia) and the World Council 
of Churches (Switzerland). 
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Institute on Religion and Public 
Policy 
US 3 Fiji, Kiribati, FSM 
Society for Threatened Peoples Germany 3 Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, 
PNG 
Human Rights Watch US 3 Fiji, PNG, Fiji II 
International Center for 
Advocates Against 
Discrimination 
US 2 Fiji II, Kiribati II 
 
Child Rights International 
Network 
UK 2 Tonga II, Kiribati II 
Pacific Concerns Resource 
Centre 
Fiji 1 Fiji 
Fundacion Mundial Dejame 
Vivir en Paz 
Costa Rica 1 Fiji 
Sexual Rights Initiative 
Coalition60 
UN 1 FSM 
University of Oklahoma 
College of Law International 
Human Rights Clinic 
US 1 PNG 
International Centre for 
Transitional Justice 
US 1 Solomon Islands 
Minority Rights Group UK 1 Fiji II 
International Trade Union 
Confederation61 
Belgium 1 Fiji II 
Reporters Sans Frontiers 
Coalition62  
France 1 Fiji II 
Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative 
India 1 Kiribati II 
 
As can be seen, the London-based Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of 
Children (‘GIEACPC’) has commented on the reviews of all Pacific states to date expect that 
of Nauru.63 The Earthjustice Coalition and the ILGA/ARC International Coalition have both 
commented on a large number of states, representing a concerted advocacy effort. However, 
it appears that the Earthjustice Coalition and the ILGA/ARC Coalition were only active for 
the first UPR cycle, as they have not submitted on any of the five Pacific states reviewed 
during the second cycle. The two most well-known international human rights NGOs appear 
to have chosen to make submissions on those states with arguably the most serious human 
rights issues. Human Rights Watch has made submissions on Fiji and PNG. Amnesty 
International has submitted on Fiji and PNG plus Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the two 
climate change threatened states of Kiribati and Tuvalu.  
Nearly all of the international NGOs which have made submissions on Pacific states are 
based in the Global North. Just three international NGOs (from a total of 20) are based in the 
Global South. Two of these submitted on Fiji – from the Pacific Concerns Resources Centre 
(‘PCRC’) and Fundacion Mundial Dejame Vivir en Paz (‘FMDVP’). PCRC is a regional 
Pacific NGO with ECOSOC consultative status based in Fiji. It was first established in 
Hawaii in 1980 with a focus on political independence and nuclear-free Pacific, relocated to 
 
60 The coalition partner (and its headquarters) was Sexual Rights Information of Micronesia (FSM). 
61 Coalition partners are 315 national affiliates whose headquarters are not separately listed. 
62 The coalition partner (and its headquarters) was the Pacific Media Centre (New Zealand). 
63 GIEACPC did in fact make a stakeholder submission on Nauru, but it was overlooked for the stakeholder 
summary. Personal communication with GIEACPC (16 October 2013, on file with author). 
16 
 
New Zealand in 1986 and then to Fiji in 1993.64 FMDVP was established in 2009. Its two-
sentence submission on Fiji focused on the rights of sexual minorities.65 The third 
international NGO based in the Global South was the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative which made a submission on Kiribati II. In addition to these three submissions from 
the Global South, as noted above, the Earthjustice Coalition in three of its submissions and 
the Sexual Rights Initiative Coalition in its one submission included national NGOs in their 
coalitions. 
 
C. Stakeholder Plenary Statements 
 
Stakeholders may make statements at the HRC plenary session before the outcome report 
is adopted. Although the focus of this article is on NGO stakeholder submissions, a review of 
the plenary statements made by stakeholders confirms the dominance of international NGOs. 
This is to be expected given that only NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status may make 
these statements. Virtually no national Pacific NGOs have this status. As noted by RRRT, 
‘[i]t is ironic that regional and international NGOs have more recognition to make statements 
on Pacific Island countries than national NGOs from our region.’66 Perhaps fortunately then, 
these stakeholder plenary statements have little impact on the substantive UPR outcomes. 
Nevertheless, for completeness, Table Three sets out a list of the NGOs (all international) 
which have made statements during the plenary sessions for the adoption of the outcome 
reports for Pacific states. The number of plenary statements ranged from four for Tonga and 
Solomon Islands to one for Palau, Tonga II and Tuvalu II. One point of particular note is the 
plenary statement made by the European Disability Forum. This statement was expressly 
made on behalf of Nuanua o Le Alofa,67 a Samoan disability rights NGO which had made its 
own stakeholder submission, and participated in the May 2011 Pacific side-event in 
Geneva.68 
 
Table Three: Stakeholder Plenary Statements69 
 








States commented on 
(in order of their review) 
Amnesty International UK 8 Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Solomon Islands, PNG, 
 
64 PCRC, ‘Pacific Concerns Resource Centre’s Submission to the Session of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on Fiji, February 2010 in Geneva’ (1 September 2009). 
65 FMDVP, ‘Stakeholder submission on Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Egypt, Madagascar, Gambia, 
Qatar, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Italy, San Marino, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (undated), 3-4. 
66 RRRT, above n 7, 51. 
67 European Disability Forum ‘Statement made by European disability Forum on behalf of Nuanua o Le Alofa 
(Samoa): Adoption of the Working Group Report on Samoa’ (24 September 2011). 
68 SPC, Pacific Island States and the Universal Periodic Review: A Toolkit for Pacific Island states to measure 
progress and compliance against Universal Periodic Review recommendations (SPC, 2012), 22-23. 
69 The information in Table Three is drawn from the records of UPR-Info at <www.upr-info.orgl>.  
70 Fiji and Kiribati’s 2nd reviews are not yet complete. The interactive dialogue for Fiji was held on 29 October 
2014, and for Kiribati was held on 19 January 2015. In each case, the adoption of the outcome report and the 




Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal 
Network 
Canada 7 Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Kiribati, 
Palau, Samoa, PNG 
World Association for the 
School as an Instrument of 
Peace (EIP) 
Geneva 4 Fiji, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru 
Franciscans International71 Geneva 4 Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu 
II, Vanuatu II 
United Nations Watch Geneva 3 Marshall Islands, FSM, Vanuatu II 
Women’s Coalition Various 1 Tonga 
Oceania Human Rights US 1 Tonga 
Earthjustice US 1 Tuvalu 
Women’s International League 
for Peace and Freedom 
Geneva 1 Fiji  
ILGA-Europe Belgium 1 Nauru 
Save the Children UK 1 Solomon Islands 
European Disability Forum 
[on behalf of Nuanua o Le 
Alofa] 
Belgium 1 Samoa 
Rencontre Africaine pour la 
defense des Droits de 
L’Homme (RADDHO) 
Senegal 1 PNG 
 
V. Exploring the Role of International NGOs 
 
I now explore some of the benefits and challenges arising from the involvement of 
international NGOs in the UPR of Pacific Island states. At the outset I note that the common 
assumption is that NGO input per se is a good thing. Certainly, the international human rights 
system would not be where it is today without the input of NGOs. However, what I aim to do 
here is explore the role of international NGOs in and around Pacific states’ UPR – looking at 
both the benefits of this input and the challenges.  
 
A. Benefits of involvement of international NGOs 
 
A first important benefit of the involvement of international NGOs is that they can, on 
occasion, fill a major gap in stakeholder information. For example, if international NGOs had 
not made submissions on PNG and FSM, there would have been very limited stakeholder 
information, with just one national stakeholder report on PNG and none on FSM (although 
two national FSM NGOs did participate in joint submissions). Similarly, corporal punishment 
of children is a significant human rights issue in the Pacific. The stakeholder submissions of 
GIEACPC on 16 Pacific reviews were successful in bringing this issue to the attention of the 
 




HRC. Corporal punishment was noted in the stakeholder summary for all 16 reviews, and 
recommendations on corporal punishment were made in nine of these.72 For Nauru, where 
GIEACPC’s submission was overlooked for the stakeholder summary, the issue of corporal 
punishment is notably absent from the review. 
A second, and related, benefit is the expertise that some international NGOs may bring. 
One of the purposes of the UPR is ‘the sharing of best human rights practices.’73 International 
NGOs, especially those with a single-issue focus, may be able to draw on a wealth of 
experience to inform the interactive dialogue and suggest solutions to complex issues. For 
example, the International Center for Transitional Justice focused its Solomon Islands 
submission on the Government response to the 1998-2003 ‘Tensions’ including the work of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (‘TRC’) and prosecutions for Tension-related 
crimes. It identified that none of the Tension trials had encompassed prosecution for gender-
based violence, and linked this to low levels of domestic violence prosecutions generally.74 
These important issues were touched on briefly by just one other international stakeholder. 
Ultimately two recommendations were made to and accepted by Solomon Islands concerning 
ongoing funding for the work of the TRC.75 
Another example of the expertise contributed by international NGOs was the five 
stakeholder submissions of the Marist and Franciscans Coalition. Four of these submissions 
focused on the issue of children’s education, with the submission on PNG also addressing the 
rights of people with disabilities. The Vanuatu, PNG and Solomon Islands submissions 
included first-hand information drawn from surveys of children and young people. All four 
submissions made detailed and practical suggestions for realising the right to education. For 
example, the Vanuatu submission recommended a parent awareness program to educate 
parents on the importance of primary education for children.76 The Kiribati submission 
highlighted concerns at the narrowness of the school curriculum, especially at the secondary 
level, and the impact of this on low enrolment levels.77 The PNG submission drew on survey 
data and the voices of children themselves to identify poor health, abuse of drugs and cultural 
attitudes towards girls’ education as factors hindering education.78 The submission on 
Solomon Islands recommended that ‘teachers receive their salaries regularly and on time.’79 
Children’s right to education featured in the recommendations ultimately made to all four 
states, albeit not at the level of detail specified in the Marist and Franciscans’ submissions.80 
A third benefit of international NGO input into Pacific reviews is that international NGOs 
may be able to make submissions that national NGOs are unable to make because of safety 
 
72 GIEACPC, ‘Corporal punishment of children in the Universal Periodic Review: Analysis of Sessions 1 to 18 
(2008-2014)’ (February 2014). This report excludes information on recommendations to Vanuatu II, Fiji II and 
Kiribati II. 
73 Annex, above n 3, [27(b)]. 
74 A/HRC/WG.6/11/SLB/3 (2011), [30]. 
75 A/HRC/18/8 (2011), [81.42]-[81.43]. 
76 Marist and Franciscans Coalition, ‘ONG submission for the Universal Periodic Review: Republic of Vanuatu’ 
(undated), [4] and recommendation 2. 
77 Marist and Franciscans Coalition, ‘Human Rights Council: UPR or Republic of Kiribati: 8th session’ 
(November 2009), [13], [16], [18] and recommendation 6. 
78 Marist and Franciscans Coalition, ‘UPR for Independent State of Papua New Guinea: 11th Session (May 
2011)’ (October 2010), [8]-[10], [13] and recommendation 16.8. 
79 Marist and Franciscans Coalition, ‘UPR for Solomon Islands: 11th Session (May 2011)’ (8 November 2010), 
recommendation 5. 
80 Vanuatu: A/HRC/12/14 (2009), [56.20]; Kiribati: A/HRC/15/3 (2010), [66.68]; Papua New Guinea: 
A/HRC/18/8 (2011), [79.59]-[79.66]; Solomon Islands: A/HRC/18/8 (2011), [81.56]-[81.58]. 
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concerns. International NGOs will generally have less need to factor in domestic political 
concerns than national NGOs. This concern is not one which arises in most of the Pacific, but 
this was a real issue in the case of Fiji’s review in 2010. Commodore Frank Bainimarama 
made threats on national radio against the two NGO leaders who had participated in the side-
event on Fiji in Geneva.81 In situations like that of Fiji, it may be that international NGOs are 
able to make submissions that national NGOs simply cannot. Put another way, transnational 
advocacy networks involving both international and national NGOs are an effective way to 
challenge serious norm-violating states such as Fiji.82 
A related, but slightly different, benefit is where an international NGO demonstrates 
solidarity by making a submission which echoes the concerns raised by national NGOs. This 
was clearly seen in the case of Fiji’s first review where the large majority of both national 
and international submissions raised serious concerns with Fiji’s loss of democracy. This 
solidarity between national and international NGOs, with international NGOs echoing 
concerns of national NGOs implicitly gives national NGOs and their concerns greater 
credibility.  
Sometimes the concerns raised by international NGOs support not just the position of 
national NGOs but the position of the SuR itself. For example, climate change is a very real 
threat for many Pacific states, including Kiribati and Tuvalu. The submissions of the 
Earthjustice Coalition and the Franciscans Coalition on these two states supported the 
position of the states themselves in calling for international responsibility and collective 
action.83 Earthjustice urged the HRC to recognise the responsibility of major greenhouse gas 
emitting states for human rights violations suffered by Tuvaluans and i-Kiribati due to 
climate change. While Kiribati and Tuvalu could take some actions to provide their citizens 
with information and ensure opportunities for public participation in decision-making 
concerning responses to climate change, Earthjustice, citing article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, urged the international community to recognise its 
responsibility. These submissions echoed the approach of Tuvalu and Kiribati in their 
national reports and interactive dialogue. 
Collaborations between international NGOs and national grass-roots organisations may 
enable national NGOs to both make a submission and at the same time help to overcome their 
comparative invisibility. One commentator has suggested that one of the weaknesses of the 
UPR process is that ‘any unaccredited “Tom, Dick or Harry” can make a submission, which 
is then duly summarized by the OHCHR without further analysis or verification and 
published on the internet.’84 The implication is that the stakeholder summary is riddled with 
unreliable and unsubstantiated information. While this implication is not necessarily 
supported here, national grassroots organisations may have low visibility and limited capacity 
for preparing a stakeholder submission. In this context, collaboration between grassroots 
organisations and international NGOs can enable grassroots concerns to be presented 
appropriately and accorded the weight they deserve. In the Pacific, Earthjustice partnered 
with the Pohnpei Women’s Advisory Council, and the Sexual Rights Initiative partnered with 
 
81 Fiji Women’s Rights Movement, Annual Report 2010, 2. 
82 See generally the work of Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Cornell 
University Press, 1998).  
83 Earthjustice, ‘UPR of Tuvalu, December 2008: Submission of Earthjustice’ (21 July 2008); Earthjustice, 
‘UPR of the Republic of Kiribati, 2010: Submission of Earthjustice’ (2 November 2009); Franciscans 
International Coalition, ‘UPR of the Republic of Kiribati, 2014: Joint Stakeholders Submission’ (June 2014). 
84 Joanna Harrington, ‘Canada and the United Nations Human Rights Council: Dissent and Division’ (2009) 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 78, 85. 
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Sexual Rights Information of Micronesia. Both these national organisations have low 
visibility outside the Micronesian region with no established internet presence and no 
previous engagement with UN human rights mechanisms. Their participation in these 
collaborations enabled their concerns to be framed in human rights terms and treated 
seriously. 
A final benefit of the involvement of international NGOs is that they are more likely to 
have a Geneva presence, ECOSOC consultative status and the ability to undertake advocacy 
on the ground in Geneva. Research by CRIN highlights a marked difference between 
international and national NGOs here, with international NGOs generally taking the 
opportunity to lobby in Geneva, and national NGOs reporting that while they would like to 
do this, they ‘simply do not have the capacity, contacts or Geneva representation.’85 Of the 17 
Pacific reviews so far, only two side events have been held in Geneva. The first event was 
held in February 2010 before Fiji’s interactive dialogue. It was hosted by the International 
Commission of Jurists with presentations by two Fijian NGOs who had made individual 
stakeholder submissions - the Citizens Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Women’s Rights 
Movement. The stakeholder submissions had been filed in September 2009, but in the 
intervening five months, the human rights situation in Fiji had deteriorated considerably, and 
it was important to provide an update on the situation.86 
The second event was held in May 2011 when Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa and PNG 
all had their interactive dialogue in Geneva. It was jointly run by the Pacific Regional Rights 
Resource Team (‘RRRT’), the World Young Women’s Christian Association (‘YWCA’) and 
Asia Pacific Women Law and Development. Funding for two Pacific representatives to 
attend was provided by the Democracy Coalition Project.87 The presenters included two 
staffers from PIFS and RRRT (the former was also a member of the state delegations for 
Palau, Solomon Islands and Samoa, and the latter for Samoa) and three civil society 
representatives from the YWCA Solomon Islands, Nuanua o le Alofa (‘NOLA’) from Samoa 
and the Bougainville Human Rights Committee and Women’s Human Rights Defenders 
Network (from PNG).88 The event heightened interest in key Pacific human rights issues 
including climate change, trafficking and violence against women.89 The NOLA participant 
also reported that she met with a representative of the International Disability Alliance who 
introduced her to diplomats so she could lobby them on particular issues,90 and she arranged 
for the European Disability Forum to deliver a statement at the plenary on behalf of NOLA. 
These two side events were excellent examples of collaboration and networking between 
national and international NGOs.  
 
B. Challenges concerning role of international NGOs 
 
A benefit of the UPR process during the first cycle was the opportunity to ‘tell the 
Pacific’s human rights stories to the world.’91 For Pacific NGOs, as has been the case in other 
parts of the world, the UPR has been far more successful than the treaty bodies in terms of 
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mobilising civil society at the national level.92 In part this is likely because of the momentum 
which surrounds the UPR process as a result of fixed dates and clear parameters for length of 
stakeholder reports. It is also likely to be a result of the excellent preparatory workshops 
provided by RRRT, OHCHR Pacific and PIFS across the region. However, despite strong 
engagement from national NGOs, the dominance of international NGOs in Pacific states’ 
UPR has perhaps diluted the Pacific civil society voice. The stakeholder summary simply 
reflects the particular interests of the organisations that choose to make submissions. It does 
not purport to be a comprehensive civil society perspective on the full range of human rights 
issues.93 The dominance of international NGOs may therefore mean that the stakeholder 
summary does not reflect the human rights issues which are in fact of most importance to 
individuals and communities in the Pacific. Local Pacific NGOs are more likely to be 
‘connected to the people’94 and their concerns than international NGOs.  
This risk of dilution or distortion is perhaps compounded by the number of single-issue 
international NGOs. The three NGOs which made the most number of submissions were each 
focused on a single issue – corporal punishment of children, climate change and the rights of 
sexual minorities. The result is that these three issues all feature quite prominently in the 
relevant stakeholder summary. While all three issues are important in the Pacific, particularly 
climate change and corporal punishment of children, their prominence may not reflect their 
importance to Pacific peoples in their day-to-day lives. Their inclusion in the stakeholder 
summary may perhaps have crowded out other serious human rights challenges such as 
greater focus on the rights of women and the challenges facing people with disabilities.  
A related issue is the tendency of some international NGOs to focus on formal limitations 
of rights rather than actual reported human rights violations. The stakeholder submissions of 
international NGOs are often prepared from a distance, without the benefit of in-country 
research or experience. Research is desk-based only and so may give a false picture of human 
rights concerns on the ground.  An example of this is the submission by the New York based 
International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination (ICAAD), for Kiribati II. ICAAD 
conducted a desk-based review of Kiribati case law on sexual and gender based violence, and 
recommended that Kiribati should remove the possibility of customary redress in SGBV 
being considered as a mitigating factor in criminal sentencing. This submission, which 
essentially advocates a ‘trumping’ of human rights over custom, appears to take no account 
of the strong role of custom in Kiribati society. There were two submissions from national 
NGOs (representing 36 national women’s NGOs) addressing SGBV, neither of which raised 
this as an issue.95 
Another example of undue focus on formal limits on rights is the issue of abolition of the 
death penalty in Tonga. During Tonga’s first UPR in 2008, Italy made a recommendation that 
Tonga abolish the death penalty, to which Tonga responded that ‘[t]he death penalty remains 
the ultimate criminal sanction lawfully available to the State and had only been imposed in 
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the most heinous of cases some 26 years ago.’96 During Tonga’s second review in January 
2013, the issue received more prominence. The stakeholder submission of CRIN noted that 
child offenders in Tonga could be sentenced to the death penalty.97 CRIN did note that no 
executions had in fact been carried out since 1982 and that in 2005 the Supreme Court had 
concluded that the norm for sentencing should be life imprisonment, with capital punishment 
being reserved for especially heinous crimes.98 CRIN nevertheless recommended that the 
Government explicitly prohibit the death penalty for persons under 18.99 The issue of the 
death penalty was not raised by the Tongan Human Rights Taskforce in its national 
stakeholder submission and nor was it addressed in the Tongan national report. Eight states 
made recommendations to Tonga on abolition of the death penalty.100 This number of 
recommendations no doubt reflects both the inclusion of this issue in the stakeholder 
summary as well as the strong international movement towards abolition. However, despite 
being abolitionist in practice, Tonga nevertheless rejected all eight recommendations.101 In 
doing so it noted that it would continue to retain the death penalty as the ultimate sanction 
under its criminal justice system. It also referred to the 2005 Supreme Court case which had 
set the guiding policy that the death penalty will only be used ‘in the rarest of cases when the 
alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.’102 In Tonga’s view, the death penalty had 
been effective as a deterrent given its low murder rate. Ultimately, ‘Tonga understands that it 
may be seen as a de facto abolitionist of the death penalty, however in reality it reserves its 
position on utilisation of the death penalty.’103 
What can we learn from this example? First and foremost, consideration of this issue in 
the UPR has made no improvement to human rights on the ground in Tonga. This issue was 
simply not a live issue. It was not raised in the national NGO stakeholder submissions in 
either 2008 or 2013. No one has been executed in Tonga for 33 years. The Supreme Court 
has recently considered the issue and provided a strong caution against future imposition of 
the death penalty. Rather than improving the human rights situation on the ground, raising 
this issue in the UPR may in fact have undermined the situation. In its response to the 2013 
recommendations, Tonga essentially moved itself from a de facto abolitionist state to a 
retentionist state. An NGO strategy which focuses on formal limitations of rights rather than 
actual reported human rights violations may thus backfire. The ultimate aim of the UPR is 
improvement of the human rights situation on the ground, but the focus on formal limitations 
will not necessarily improve the lived reality for individuals and communities on the ground. 
Of course, formally abolishing the death penalty is useful, and would contribute to emerging 
international solidarity on this issue, but the strong focus on this issue in Tonga’s case had the 
opposite effect and appears instead to have strengthened Tonga’s commitment to the death 
penalty. 
Submissions from international NGOs appear to be most pertinent when they are based 
on in-country research and information rather than desk-based research alone. Indeed the 
OHCHR guidelines encourage NGOs to include ‘first-hand information.’104 For example, 
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Amnesty International’s submission on Solomon Islands raised two key issues of violence 
against women and the right to water and sanitation in informal settlements in Honiara. Its 
submissions on these issues were based on first-hand accounts and fieldwork conducted just 
three months before filing its stakeholder submission.105 This submission and Amnesty’s 
submissions on Fiji, Fiji II and PNG, which are also based partly on fieldwork and first-hand 
accounts, are more compelling than its submissions on Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Kiribati. 
As noted above, the large majority of international NGOs who made stakeholder 
submissions on Pacific states are based in the Global North. This may mean that the 
particular approach they take to human rights reflects a ‘Western’ bias. Traditionally, most 
international NGOs have concentrated more on civil and political rights rather than 
economic, social and cultural rights (‘ESCR’). This civil and political rights focus may in 
turn mean a bias towards male concerns.106 This has however changed in recent years with a 
good example being Amnesty International’s 2001 expansion of its mandate to include 
ESCR. Despite this welcome expansion by Amnesty and the growth in international NGOs 
who prioritise ESCR, there undoubtedly remains a strong focus by international NGOs on 
individual civil and political rights. An interesting contrast here is between the submission of 
Human Rights Watch and the submission of the joint national coalition (comprising 12 
NGOs) on Fiji’s second review. Both submissions raised issues relating to freedom of 
expression, human rights defenders, impunity for security forces, workers’ rights, 
independence of the judiciary and the 2014 elections. However, the submission of the joint 
national coalition also covered land rights of communities and the rights of women and 
children. 
The vast body of literature on NGOs suggests that NGOs from the Global South may also 
be more likely to see human rights issues from a different perspective to NGOs from the 
Global North, identifying, for example, ‘the underlying human rights problem as one of 
North-South economic relations’ and perhaps working towards more ‘transformative goals 
for society.’107 However, this is not evident in the Pacific context, and indeed there is perhaps 
some evidence of convergence of North-South approaches. For example, an ongoing and 
sometimes divisive debate between HRC member states has involved the desire by many 
states from the Global South to recognise and develop ‘third generation’ human rights such as 
the right to peace, the right to international solidarity and the right to a healthy 
environment.108 However, as noted above, the strong stakeholder submissions of the 
Earthjustice Coalition and others on the human rights impacts of climate change and the 
responsibility of other states to address this has been one of the successes of Pacific states’ 
UPR. 
One of the more contentious issues for a number of Pacific (and other) states in the UPR 
has been the issue of decriminalisation of same-sex consensual conduct.109 Although Nauru 
and Palau accepted recommendations to decriminalise same-sex conduct,110 six other states 
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(Tonga/Tonga II, Tuvalu/Tuvalu II, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Samoa and PNG) have 
rejected similar recommendations. This issue was very much on the UPR agenda during the 
first UPR cycle – in the Pacific and elsewhere – as a result of the advocacy effort of the 
ILGA/ARC International Coalition. This Coalition made submissions on eight Pacific 
reviews. Aside from Save the Children Solomon Islands, no other national NGO identified 
this issue in their stakeholder submission. Of particular interest here was the joint stakeholder 
submission of the Tongan CSO Human Rights Taskforce representing seven national 
NGOs.111 One of the stakeholders was the Tonga Leiti Association which advocates for 
improving the rights of ‘leitis’ in Tonga.112 Yet, the stakeholder submission did not raise the 
issue of decriminalisation of same-sex consensual conduct. This perhaps suggests that this is 
not currently an area of controversy or priority on the ground in Tonga, and indeed this is the 
tenor of the Tongan Government response on this issue.113 On an issue such as this where 
different cultural norms and domestic constituent concerns are highly relevant to the 
prospects of future reform, for the sole NGO voice to be an international one is less than 
desirable.114 It could also undermine the sense that there is a genuinely ‘international’ human 
rights movement in which participants from both the North and South share common projects 
and common agendas.115 Seeking to challenge local cultural norms in order to meet the 
campaigning agenda of the international NGO may convey a tone of ‘moral superiority’116 
and runs the risk of meeting the charge of ‘cultural imperialism.’117 A ‘softer’ approach, more 
consistent with the ‘Pacific way,’ which encourages domestic discussion, away from the 
international spotlight, may be more likely to lead, in the long run, to a positive human rights 
outcome.  
A further possible challenge is the prospect of international NGOs and national Pacific 
NGOs taking patently divergent positions on particular issues. This could hamper the search 
for common ground, be a distraction, or worse, result in the marginalisation of the indigenous 
Pacific voice. One issue which is an illustration of this concern is the question of institutional 
machinery for protecting human rights in the Pacific region. Given their size and capacity 
limitations, there is a very real issue as to whether establishment of an NHRI fully compliant 
with the Paris Principles is feasible, or indeed sensible, especially for the smaller Pacific 
states.118 Instead, a regional human rights mechanism may be a more sensible solution. This 
issue has received some focus in the region in recent years, although not yet any political 
commitment or momentum to support such a development.119 Although some Pacific states 
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have indicated a preference for a regional mechanism in their UPR reports or the interactive 
dialogue,120 the issue has received little attention from other states, being instead dwarfed by 
the ‘one-size fits all’ approach, with numerous recommendations that Pacific states establish 
NHRIs compliant with the Paris Principles. At the NGO level, a number of national NGOs 
also indicated interest in a regional mechanism.121 Although the international NGO Oceania 
Human Rights has supported calls for a regional mechanism,122 most other international 
NGOs have either not engaged with this issue at all, or instead simply reiterated calls for an 
NHRI.123 Although the stakeholder summary faithfully notes the stakeholder calls for a 
regional human rights mechanism, this has not translated into this being a live issue in the 
interactive dialogue. An issue which is therefore of some interest to Pacific NGOs (and 
Pacific states) appears to have been lost in the rhetoric around NHRIs. 
A final issue concerning the involvement of international NGOs is whether their 
dominance undermines the credibility of national NGOs. One concern is that, because of their 
generally higher profile in Geneva, more weight may be given by OHCHR to the stakeholder 
submissions made by international NGOs. Existing literature disagrees on this point. 
Lawrence Moss has suggested that ‘[w]ell-known and highly regarded international NGOs 
that have a presence in Geneva, consultative status with the UN, and are known to OHCHR 
staff will be more likely to be deemed credible and can be more certain that the information 
that they submit will be deemed credible and reliable by OHCHR staff.’124 A contrasting 
view was however expressed in 2009, where in response to the same concern that OHCHR 
might be inclined to ‘rely on information provided by international NGOs at the expense of 
lower profile national NGOs’ it was noted that most national NGOs appeared to be satisfied 
with the OHCHR summary.125 
OHCHR has its own internal standards and practices for determining what NGO 
information will be included in the stakeholder summary (ie what information is ‘reliable and 
credible’), but these guidelines are not publicly available.126 Much may depend here on the 
attitude and approach of the individual OHCHR drafter tasked with preparing contributions to 
the stakeholder summary for a particular state. Julie Billaud has noted that OHCHR drafters 
are ‘acutely aware of their responsibility to remain true to the message people living 
somewhere else in the world had asked them to pass on to the international community.’127 It 
is difficult to make an overall assessment of this issue in the Pacific context, although it can 
be noted that given the modest number of NGO submissions for Pacific states, the OHCHR 
 
120 See for example Tonga: A/HRC/8/48 (2008), [63(25)]; Tuvalu: A/HRC/10/84 (2009), [65]; Kiribati: 
A/HRC/15/3/Add.1 (2010), [30]-[36]; Solomon Islands: A/HRC/18/8 (2011), [27]. 
121 See for example the stakeholder submissions of the Legal Literacy Project (on Tuvalu); the Kiribati Women 
Activists Network (on Kiribati); Te Toa Matoa and the School for the Disabled (on Kiribati); Coalition of NGOs 
(on Marshall Islands); Marshall Islands Special Parents Association (on Marshall Islands); Evergreen Concern 
Group (on Nauru); the Samoan Umbrella for Non-Governmental Organisations (on Samoa); the CSO Human 
Rights Taskforce (on Tonga II). 
122 See the stakeholder submissions of Oceania Human Rights on Nauru, Palau, Samoa, PNG and Tonga II. 
123 See for example the stakeholder submissions of Amnesty International (on Solomon Islands and PNG); 
International Center for Transitional Justice (on Solomon Islands).  
124 Moss, above n 44, 132. 
125 Gareth Sweeney and Yuri Sato, ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights 
Council’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 203, 207. 
126 See however the interesting discussion of the drafting process in Julie Billaud, ‘Keepers of the “truth”: 
Producing “transparent” documents for the Universal Periodic Review’ in Charlesworth and Larking (eds), 




drafters have more space to accommodate NGO views than is the case where there are a 
higher number of NGO submissions.  
A different credibility concern is the possible scepticism of some states in the Global 
South towards information provided by international NGOs. Lucia Nader has noted that more 
participation by NGOs from the Global South in the work of the HRC generally is vital not 
only because most major human rights violations occur in the Global South, but also because 
of the geographic composition of the HRC and the political implications of this for its 
operations. African, Asian and Caribbean states hold 34 of the 47 seats in the HRC, and 
‘[m]any of these countries question the legitimacy of the action and the credibility of the 
information issued by NGOs that are not from their respective countries or regions.’128 
 
VI. How can International NGOs “do good better”? 
 
This section considers how international NGOs can work more productively with national 
Pacific NGOs in the context of the UPR in order to respond to the concern that international 
NGOs may, albeit with the best of intentions, be contributing to a distortion of civil society 
concerns in the OHCHR summaries prepared for Pacific states’ reviews. It seeks to offer 
some thoughts in answer to the question: how can international NGOs ‘do good better’? The 
continued involvement of international NGOs in the UPR of Pacific states is undoubtedly 
important. This section therefore has the aim of exploring how international NGOs might 
develop and improve their work in the Pacific. An underlying theme is that the greater profile 
and influence of international NGOs brings with it a certain responsibility. Another theme is 
that international NGOs need to continue to engage with the challenge of connecting the 
‘global’ with the ‘local’ and ensuring that what happens in Geneva is based on the real human 
rights concerns of individuals and communities in the Pacific. Underlying all this, there may 
be a need for the ‘cultivation of humility’ by international NGOs.129 There might even be 
scope for ‘institutional learning’ by an international NGO resulting from engagement with 
Pacific NGOs.130 
A first point to consider (if only to dismiss it) is whether it should simply be accepted that 
the roles of national and international NGOs in relation to the UPR are in fact already 
suitably complementary. Research by CRIN in 2010 identified a clear distinction between 
those NGOs who engage at the Geneva level (primarily international NGOs) and those far 
from Geneva (national NGOs).131 Rather than trying to overcome this, perhaps this division 
should be acknowledged and used as a foundation for future action. International NGOs with 
consultative status could focus their UPR input on the Geneva elements of the UPR process – 
stakeholder submissions, advocacy and statements at the HRC plenary. National NGOs could 
focus on activities at the national level - participating in national consultations and, perhaps 
most importantly, using the outcome report to engage in advocacy at home. As noted by 
Moss, some of the most significant opportunities for NGO advocacy associated with the UPR 
‘lie not in the proceedings in the Human Rights Council in Geneva, but internally in societies 
around the world.’132 While the work of international NGOs is important, it can never be a 
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substitute for local advocacy efforts as it is these which will make the most difference on the 
ground. This understanding of the UPR perhaps suggests that international and national 
NGOs should actively seek to complement the work of each other, rather than duplicate (or 
diverge) within the same (limited) space. Importantly though, in order for this division of 
labour to work, there would need to be proactive and collaborative partnerships between the 
two, so that the activity of international NGOs in Geneva truly reflects Pacific concerns. 
Without such close and deep partnerships, there is a risk that what happens in Geneva 
becomes increasingly divorced from the lived human rights reality on small Pacific islands on 
the other side of the world. It is therefore suggested that simple complementarity is not the 
way forward, but rather opportunities for greater collaboration between national and 
international NGOs should be developed. 
An obvious area for improving collaboration between national and international NGOs is 
for international NGOs to actively engage national Pacific NGOs in the making of joint 
stakeholder submissions. Although there may be differences in international and national 
NGOs, they presumably share a common underlying aim in this context – improvement of 
human rights on the ground in the Pacific. However, as noted above, to date only four of the 
120 submissions on Pacific states were made by coalitions of national and international 
NGOs. Some OHCHR staff have reportedly suggested that national NGOs gain credence and 
inclusion in the OHCHR stakeholder summary by making joint stakeholder submissions - 
either together with other national NGOs or with an international NGO.133 Joint submissions 
may also result in a more cohesive approach to advocacy and minimise duplication between 
submissions.134 In countries such as Fiji, it may not be safe to report individually, but 
submitting as part of a coalition may be possible. Another advantage of joint submissions for 
smaller national NGOs who may be unfamiliar with reporting guidelines is that they could 
submit information to the report coordinator, with the coordinator responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the reporting guidelines, relieving smaller national NGOs of this 
responsibility.135  
For international NGOs, collaboration with national NGOs will add legitimacy to their 
work. Although the value of international NGOs is primarily in their role as ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ rather than representatives of any sector of society,136 the nature of the UPR 
submission process is that international NGOs do in some way speak for or on behalf of 
peoples or problems in the Pacific. This is arguably problematic from an accountability 
perspective.137 Collaboration with national NGOs who have local knowledge and presence 
will at least go some way towards ensuring that submissions reflect Pacific voices. It may 
help to overcome the ‘worrying disconnection’ between the advocacy of international NGOs 
and the best interests of the peoples that they proclaim to serve.138 In collaborating on a joint 
stakeholder submission, international NGOs will however still need to be careful to avoid 
imposing their own will as this could alienate the victims sought to be protected, undermine 
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community spirit and even weaken existing human rights protections.139 International NGOs 
that encourage national NGOs to determine priorities, and draw on local expertise are likely 
to be more effective in the long-term.140 
Aside from making a stakeholder submission, the second key element of the Geneva side 
of the UPR is lobbying and advocacy. While national NGOs can seek to lobby diplomats 
based in their own country and urge that the information is passed on to Geneva, the most 
effective lobbying is of diplomats in Geneva who will actually participate in the interactive 
dialogue. National Pacific NGOs, like others from the Global South, have virtually no 
capacity to do this. Challenges include the lack of ECOSOC status, limited funding, visa 
restrictions, language issues and lack of Geneva ‘know-how.’ There is real scope here for one 
or more international NGOs to take an ‘agency’ approach whereby national NGOs effectively 
‘piggy-back’ on the consultative status of an international NGO.141 For example, it is possible 
to envisage a system whereby an international NGO offers a service to national NGOs to 
appear at side-events on its behalf, undertake one-on-one lobbying of individual missions and 
make a statement at the HRC plenary session. Currently this occurs informally and on an ad 
hoc basis but a more structured system may enable the voices of national grassroots NGOs to 
be heard more strongly in Geneva. 
As well as an agency mechanism, there may be opportunities for existing mechanisms for 
NGO advocacy in Geneva to be used more creatively. For example UPR Info facilitates pre-
session side events for NGOs and interested states before each UPR session. However, 
attendance at these meetings is currently in person only. Perhaps in the future it would be 
possible for national NGOs to participate via Skype, or, more practically given the different 
time zones, to at least send in short video messages which could be played at this pre-session. 
For those national NGOs who do manage to travel to Geneva, there are numerous 
practical challenges involved in ‘navigating’ Geneva – both physically and metaphorically. 
These include the high financial costs and impact on staff availability by participating in 
HRC sessions in Geneva, the lack of familiarity with the procedure of the HRC, and the lack 
of access to information.142 A government delegate from Tuvalu who travelled to Geneva for 
the adoption of Tuvalu’s outcome report tells the tale of her ‘travel nightmare’ which 
included not only getting to Geneva from Tuvalu but then taking two hours to find the way 
from her hotel to the ‘nearby’ UN headquarters.143 Many international NGOs are well-placed 
to help national NGOs navigate some of the challenges on the ground in Geneva, and there is 
much assistance already available. Mandat International runs an information service for 
NGOs attending conferences and meetings in Geneva.144 Its ‘Welcome Desk’ service 
provides information and support to facilitate participation of delegates at the HRC.145 The 
International Service for Human Rights works to support the work of human rights 
defenders.146 UPR Info aims at raising awareness on the UPR and providing capacity-
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building tools to different actors in the process, including NGOs.147 Clearly then, there is 
much that international NGOs are already doing to help national NGOs on the ground in 
Geneva. 
Although the second cycle of the UPR is now well underway, it is still a comparatively 
new mechanism. For many national NGOs from the Pacific, a stakeholder submission may be 
their first engagement with the UN human rights system. International NGOs can play a role 
in continuing to raise awareness of this new mechanism, how it operates and how national 
NGOs can successfully engage with it. As noted by CRIN, ‘[m]any organisations have been 
developing their own strategies, toolkits and evaluations, and have collected a certain amount 
of “learning” that could benefit many smaller, less experienced organisations around the 
world.’148 Engagement by international NGOs with national NGOs in the context of the UPR 
will strengthen the ability and capacity of the latter to engage effectively with other UN 
mechanisms, including the treaty bodies. 
Finally, aside from deeper collaboration between national and international NGOs in and 
around the UPR, more fundamental structural change of international NGOs themselves 
could improve their input to the UPR process for Pacific states and others from the Global 
South. Many international NGOs already seek to ensure that their staff are globally diverse 
and they actively devolve authority to offices located in the Global South. Increasingly too, 
sophisticated organisations are being formed which aim to ensure that they are truly ‘global’ 
in outlook with staff located around the world, grassroots members worldwide and a deep 





A key aim of this article was to explore whether the involvement of international NGOs 
in the UPR of Pacific states has a distorting effect on the interactive dialogue in Geneva, and 
in particular whether it dilutes the impact of the Pacific civil society voice. While it is clear 
that there are many benefits from the input of international NGOs into Pacific states’ reviews, 
there are also challenges. Some international NGOs have tended to focus on formal 
limitations of rights rather than actual human rights violations. Where an international NGO 
is lobbying on specialised issues such as abolition of the death penalty, the prominence given 
to these issues in the UPR may be disproportionate to the actual human rights concerns on the 
ground. The limited number of joint stakeholder submissions from coalitions of national and 
international NGOs is of concern in this regard. 
However, the unprecedented involvement of national Pacific NGOs in the UPR makes it 
clear that human rights are not simply being imposed from the top down by an international 
elite. Indeed, the enthusiasm of national NGOs illustrates that the demand for human rights is 
issuing from civil society within the Pacific. International NGOs are therefore urged to ensure 
that they are not distorting this authentic local voice. Rather, they should do all that they can 
to support national Pacific NGOs so that their concerns are reflected in the UPR. 
As the UPR process matures during the second cycle, there needs to be evolution in the 
relationship between international and national NGOs. The good intentions of international 
NGOs are not always sufficient to produce desirable results.149 With the support of 
international NGOs, increased involvement of Pacific NGOs in the UPR would result in the 
 
147 See <www.upr-info.org>. 
148 CRIN, above n 45, 2. 
149 Bell and Carens, above n 106, 302. 
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deliberations of the Human Rights Council becoming, to borrow the words of former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ‘richer and more diverse, yet grounded in reality.’150 
International NGOs are urged to rise to the challenge of connecting the global with the local; 
to ‘do good better’ in order to contribute to the ultimate goal of the UPR – improving the 
human rights situation on the ground in the Pacific. 
 
150 ‘Report of the Secretary-General in response to the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United 
Nations-Civil Society Relations’ A/59/354 (2004), [4]. 
